

Message Text

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17/47

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHC 1009

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 0647

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 3.)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, HU, UN

SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN PERFORMANCE IN ICCS

REFS: A) STATE 045415; B) STATE 051249; C) SAIGON 3401;
D) SAIGON 02133; E) BUDAPEST 0596; F) STATE A-10423;
G) SAIGON 3472; H) BUDAPEST 0633

1. IN FURTHER INPLEMENTATION OF INSTRUCTIONS ON SUB-REGIONAL
SITES CONTAINED IN REFTEL A, I MET WITH HUNARIAN FONOFF
STATE SECY JOZSEP MARJAI MARCH 16. MEETING TURNED INTO
EXTENDED CONVERSATION, WITH MARJAI CONVEYING IN RESPONSE
TO MY PRESENTATION ALMOST MARATHON EXPLANATION OF GOH
VIETNAM POLICY AND CURRENT VIEWS. I ALSO USED OCCASION TO
DELIVER NOTE CONTAINING INFO ON DRV VIOLATIONS OF PARIS
AGREEMENT (REFTEL B). IN ADDITION, I CONVEYED THE NEGATIVE
IMPACT GOH'S INITIAL REFUSAL TO INVESTIGATE CAI LAY
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INCIDENT (REFTEL C) HAD MADE AND DISCUSSED GENERAL PROBLEM

OF THEIR REFUSAL TO ENGAGE IN INVESTIGATIONS.

2. AT START OF MEETING I DELIVERED DEPT'S NOTE ON DRV VIOLATIONS OF PARIS AGREEMENT, NOTING IT WAS ALSO BEING SENT TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN PARIS CONFERENCE ON ICCS. IN GIVING HIM THE NOTE I CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO THE MAGNITUDE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT IN ITS ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF 100,000 TROOPS, HEAVY NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND SA-2'S. COMMENTED THAT THROUGH THESE STEPS NORTH VIETNAM SEEMED TO BE SEEKING ACAPABILITY FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM TO WHICH THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS DEMANDED PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. SAID THAT USG HOPED THAT GOH AND OTHER MEMBERS AT PARIS CONFERENCE ON ICCS WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ACCOMPLISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. I ALSO OBSERVED THAT NOTE REFUTED DRV ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS BY THE US, DRAWING ON SOME OF DETAILS OF OUR PRESENCE IN DEPT'S A-10423 DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION. MARJAI LISTENED CAREFULLY, GLANCED THROUGH NOTE AND SAID THEY WOULD STUDY IT CAREFULLY.

3. I THEN TURNED TO ORIGINAL PURPOSE FOR WHICH I HAD REQUESTED MEETING, I.E. TO URGE THAT GOH SHOULD NOT ONLY REMAIN IN ALL PRESENT SUB-REGIONAL SITES BUT ALSO REOCCUPY SITES THEY AND POLES HAD PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED. NOW MANNED ONLY BY INDONESIANS AND IRANIANS. I SAID WE WERE INFORMED THAT HUNGARIAN DELEGATION IN ICCS HAD PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL FROM 6 FURTHER SUB-REGIONAL SITES AND IT WAS PURSUING THIS OBJECTIVE IN COOPERATION WITH THE POLES. FAR FROM THIS WE FELT THEY HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO RETURN TO THE VACATED SITES. AMBASSADOR ESZTERGALYOS HAD SPOKEN TO ME ABOUT THE SECURITY ASPECTS INVOLVED, BUT THERE CLEARLY WAS ONE DEGREE OF RISK IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION IN A CEASE-FIRE AREA, WHICH WAS ONE REASON WHY MILITARY UNITS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. SECTIONS 4 AND 9 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT CLEARLY REQUIRED ICCS PARTIES TO BE PRESENT AT REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL SITES. PRESENCE OF ICCS TEAMS IN THOSE SITES WENT TO THE HEART OF ONE ASPECT OF ICCS RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES BE CARRIED OUT AND THAT HUNGARIAN AND POLISH DELEGATIONS NOT ONLY REMAIN IN PRESENT SITES BUT

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REOCCUPY THOSE THEY HAD EVACUATED.

4. MARJAI, WHO HAD BEEN PROVIDED FULL DOSSIER FOR MEETING, REPLIED FIRST WITH A LENGTHY LEGALISTIC DEFENSE OF THEIR PRESENT POSITION AND ATTITUDE IN VIETNAM. HE REITERATED GOH COMMITMENT TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND ITS DESIRE TO SEE AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT COMPLETELY. HE SAID THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT

THAT OF ICCS BUT OF THE PARTIES. (I AGREED BUT NOTED THAT ICCS HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION.) WITH REGARD TO MY REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 4 AND 9, MARJAI SAID PARIS AGREEMENT WAS LIKE A BIBLE IN THAT IT COULD BE INTERPRETED SEVERAL WAHU. HE NOTED THAT ENTRY POINTS CALLED FOR IN AGREEMENT HAD NEVER BEEN MANNED BECAUSE THE PARTIES NEVER REACHED REQUISITE UNDERSTANDING. SOME OTHER SITES HAD NEVER BEEN MANNED EITHER, AND IN ONE OF EVACUATED SITES EVEN INDONESIANS AND IRANIANS WERE NOT PRESENT. IF THERE WERE ANY ILLEGALITIES IN SITUATION IT WAS THAT TWO PARTIES WERE NOT CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE AGREEMENT (WHICH OF COURSE HE IMPLIED WAS SAIGON'S FAULT). HE MAINTAINED THAT UNDER AGREEMENT TPJMC SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN PLACE AT ALL LOCATIONS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OF ICCS, AND IT COULD THEREFORE BE ARGUED THAT HUNGDEL HAD TECHNICALLY VIOLATED AGREEMENT BY OCCUPYING SITES IN FIRST PLACE. FAILURE OF TPJMC TO TAKE ITS PLACE IN ALL LOCATIONS HAD RESULTED IN LACK OF NECESSARY PHYSICAL SECURITY. SAIGON ADMINISTRATION HAD ALSO FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR GOH PERSONNEL AND TO ENSURE RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HUNGDEL SITES.

5. MARJAI THEN SAID THAT FOR GOH THE SECURITY OF ITS ICCS PERSONNEL WAS NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER FACTOR THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT: IT WAS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT. THEY HAD ALREADY LOST TWO PEOPLE. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WELFARE OF HUNGARIANS IN VIETNAM; AND HE COULD NOT EXPOSE THEM TO RISK. HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS WERE NOT THERE TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTION BUT BECAUSE TASK UNDER THE AGREEMENT REQUIRED SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES AND HARDSHIPS THAT SOLDIERS WERE EXPECTED TO ENDURE MORE READILY THAN CIVILIANS. (TONE AND STRENGTH WAS VERY MUCH LIKE THAT REPORTED IN SAIGON 3472 WHERE SAME POINT MADE THERE ON 15TH).
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6. MARJAI THEN SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE GOH TO EVACUATE THE 6 SITES. IT WAS THEIR DESIRE TO REMAIN IN THE SITES, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG THEY COULD DO SO UNDER CURRENT UNSAFE CONDITIONS. HE THEN REFERRED TO GVN ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS NEAR THE SITES. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF 320 OR 400 METERS, BUT OF HAVING THEM PLACED WHERE THEY DID NOT CREATE SECURITY EXPOSURE TO ICCS MEMBERS. I SAID IT WAS HELPFUL TO HEAR HIM SAY THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO STAY IN THE SITES. I DID NOT REFER DIRECTLY TO HIS COMMENT ABOUT THE ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS, SAYING ONLY THAT IT WAS NOT OUR DESIRE TO EXPOSE ANYONE TO UNNECESSARY RISKS BUT THAT SAFETY IN VIETNAM COULD NOT BE THE SAME AS IN BUDAPEST. I ADDED IT ALSO IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE GVN WAS MUCH MORE COOPERATIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY OF ICCS MEMBERS THAN WAS THE

VIET CONG. (ALTHOUGH I PUT MOST OF MY EMPHASIS ON REFILLING THE ABANDONED SITES, AT ONE POINT ASKING WHAT STEPS HUNGARY HAD TAKEN TO SEEK SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM PRG SO THAT SITES COULD BE REOCCUPIED, MARJAI COMMENTED ONLY ON THE CURRENT SITES AND NEVER GAVE A DIRECT ANSWER ABOUT THE OLD ONES.)

7. FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATIONS ON ABOVE POINTS, I TOLD MARJAI THAT THIS CONCLUDED BY INSTRUCTIONS BUT I HAD TWO OTHER

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ACTION EA-14

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PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

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FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1010

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BUDAPEST 0647

MATTERS I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION IF HE HAD TIME. MARJAI SAID TO GO AHEAD. I SAID THESE DEALT WITH THE CAI LAY INCIDENT, MENTIONED IN THE NOTE, AND WITH THE BROADER QUESTION OF HUNGARY'S ROLE IN INVESTIGATIONS WHICH THE INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTED.

8. ON CAI LAY INCIDENT I SAID BEST I COULD DO TO CONVEY TO HIM SENSE OF REACTION THAT HUNGARIAN REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATIONS CAUSES WAS TO READ TO HIM PORTIONS OF TELEGRAM (REFTEL C) I HAD RECEIVED FROM SAIGON. I THEN PARAPHRASED TO HIM PARA 3, DEALING WITH THEIR LACK OF

PARTICIPATION IN INVESTIGATION OF CAI LAY INCIDENT,
AND PARAS 5 AND 6 CONCERNING GEN HEIP'S PROPOSAL IN JAN AND
THE PRG REJECTION. I ADDED I HAD JUST RECEIVED CABLE SAYING
PRG HAD ALSO NOW ASKED FOR INVESTIGATION AND ASSUMED ONE
WOULD THEREFORE NOW GO AHEAD.

9. MARJAI THEN REACTED SHARPLY. SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY
CABLED INSTRUCTIONS ON MARCH 13 TO HUNGARIAN DELEGATION TO
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PARTICIPATE IN AN INVESTIGATION, SAYING HUNGARY WOULD FEEL
STRONGLY NOT ONLY WHEN A NUMBER OF CHILDREN WERE KILLED BUT
EVEN IF ONLY ONE WERE. SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT PARTICIPATION IN THIS INVESTIGATION WAS NOT A
PRECEDENT, BUT AN EXCEPTION TO THE AGREEMENT TO START
INVESTIGATIONS FROM OCT 1 ON, AND ALSO WAS NOT A COMPROMISE
ON GOH DEMAND FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR INVESTIGATIONS.
(HE CLEARLY MEANT TO CONVEY THAT HE HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE PRG DECIDED TO MAKE A COMPLAINT, AND HE IMPLIED,
BUT DID NOT SAY, THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED PARTICIPA-
TION WHETHER PRG AGREED OR NOT). I REPLIED THAT I WAS
PLEASED TO HAVE THIS INFORMATION, WHICH WAS ENTIRELY NEW
TO US. MARJAI ALSO REACTED TO INFO THAT ICCS HAD AN 82MM
TAIL FIN FROM A MORTAR OF COMMUNIST MANUFACTURE. ASKED
WHOSE REPORT THIS WAS, I SAID IT WAS FROM OUR EMBASSY;
HE WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS.

10. MARJAI THEN SAID THE BALME FOR LACK OF INVESTIGATIONS
COULD NOT BE LAID AT THEIR DOOR; GOH WAS NOT HOLDING THEM UP.
ONLY PROBLEM WAS WITH OTHER MEMBERS. AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
REACHED TO OPEN INVESTIGATION OF ALL INCIDENTS STARTING WITH
OCT. 1, 1973 BUT THEN IRANIANS HAD INTRODUCED ARTIFICIAL
BARRIER OF SAYING THEY COULD NOT SIGN REPORT AS FULL MEMBER ON
CASES BEFORE THEIR ARRIVAL. HE SAID OTHER ICCS MEMBERS HAD NOT
SEEN INCIDENTS TAKE PLACE EITHER, SO IRAN SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON
SAME FOOTING. I SAID OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT ISSUE WAS NOT
THIS BUT THAT SECURITY ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED ON THEIR SIDE TO
POINT WHERE IT APPEARED THEY WERE USING THIS ISSUE TO PRECLUDE
PERFORMING ONE OF
THEIR MAIN FUNCTIONS UNDER AGREEMENT. MARJAI SAID IRANAINS
AND INDONESIANS HAD RAISED ARTIFICIAL PROBLEM IN AREA OF
SECURITY TOO, PROPOSING THAT GUARANTEES FROM ONE SIDE SHOULD
BE ENOUGH. GUARANTEES ABSOLUTELY HAD TO BE RECEIVED FROM
BOTH SIDES. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THE GUARANTEE PROBLEM WAS
A VIET CONG PROBLEM. IN SAYING THAT THE ONLY BARRIER TO
INVESTIGATIONS WAS POSED BY THE IRANIAN AND INDONESIAN
POSITIONS, WAS HE SAYING THAT THE PRG WOULD BE PREPARED
TO GIVE A GENERAL GUARANTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS AND
THAT THEY COULD THEREFORE BE STARTED? MARJAI, WHO EARLIER
HAD IMPLIED THIS, THEN STATED IT DIFFERENTLY. HE SAID HE

UNDERSTOOD THE INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE HAD BEEN RESOLVED
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READ FROM GOH REPORT OF MARCH 14 MEETING OF ICCS ASYING
THAT AFTER CONVERSATIONS WITH GVN AND PRG, IRAN AND INDONESIA
AGREED THAT INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH GUARANTEES
FROM BOTH SIDES. MARJAI SAID THE CONTACT WITH SAIGON AND PRG
HAD BEEN MADE BY IRAN AND INDONESIA, NOT GOH, BUT HE ASSUMED
THAT THIS AGREEMENT MEANT INVESTIGATIONS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN.
I SAID WE HAD NO SUCH REPORT BUT THAT IF PRG WAS NOW
READY TO GIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES AND INVESTIGATIONS WERE
GOING TO BE STARTED THIS WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP. COMMENT:
WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT MARJAI'S DESCRIPTION
OF SITUATION IN MARCH 14 MEETING IS ACCURATE AND WOULD
WELCOME EMBASSY SAIGON COMMENTS.

11. MRJAI THEN REPEATED THAT GOH TOOK ITS RESPONSIBILITIES
AS ICCS MEMBER SERIOUSLY. IT HAD ASSUMED THANKLESS TASK AT
REQUEST OF US AND DRV AND IN INTERESTS OF SECURING PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM. JOB WAS UNPLEASANT, COSTLY, AND NOT A
POPULAR ONE WITH HUNGARIANS. HUNGARIANS AND POLES COULD
NOT BE MADE SCAPEGOATS FOR FAILURE OF SIGNATORIES OF PARIS
AGREEMENT TO PUT END TO WAR. ICCS CANNOT STOP FIGHTING OR
BY ITSELF BRING ABOUT POLITICAL SOLUTION. I TOLD HIM THAT
OUR PURPOSE IN DEMARCHE WAS NOT THAT OF PLACING BLAME BUT
TO SEE THAT PARIS AGREEMENT IS CARRIED OUT AND A PEACEFUL
SITUATION CREATED IN SVN. GOH AND USG HAD DIFFERENT
POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS TOWARD VIETNAM. BUT WE HAD REACHED
AGREEMENT TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND LEAVE POLITICAL MATTERS
TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. I SAID I HAD NOTED HIS EARLIER
REITERATION OF GOH COMMITMENT TO PARIS AGREEMENT; IN THIS
SENSE WE HAD AN AREA WHERE OUR INTERESTS SHOULD OVERLAP IN
CREATION OF A NON-VIOLENT S
E E E E E E E

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